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Abstract
Does formal contracting foster cooperation in a buyer-supplier relationship?
In line with the literature, we find that a renegotiable contract with relationship-
specific joint investments does not make it possible to reach the first-best. How-
ever, we show that a renegotiable contract may induce more cooperation than an
informal arrangement can. This result may help to understand how cooperation
emerges in Japanese procurement practices, which typically involve relationship-
specific joint investments and renegotiable contracts.
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1 Introduction
A growing range of production activities is now subcontracted. Firms split their
production process and outsource activities, from product design to assembly.
This split expands vertical inter-firm relationships and trade in customized parts.
In such vertical relationships, the “hold-up problem” appears to be crucial (Klein,
Crawford and Alchian, 1978). The canonical example goes as follows. A buyer
commissions a supplier to produce a tailor-made input. Either the supplier or
both the buyer and the supplier make ex ante non-contractible and relationship-
specific investments to transact. At the (re)negotiation stage, investors are locked
into the relationship and risk not receiving ex post the overall return of their
autonomous investments. Two potential economic inefficiencies result from the
hold-up problem. The investors may under-invest in specific assets (Grossman
and Hart, 1986) and/or waste resources to protect her investment returns.
Following the classification introduced in Che and Hausch (1999), autonomous
specific investments can be either ‘selfish’, when they generate a direct benefit
only for the investor, ‘purely cooperative’, when the direct benefit only goes to the
partner of the investor, or ‘hybrid’, when it offers direct benefits to both parties.
A first stream of the literature concentrates on selfish investments and shows that
simple renegotiable fixed-price contracts can solve the hold-up problem (Chung,
1991; Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey, 1994; Edlin and Reichelstein, 1995, 1996
and Nöldeke and Schmidt, 1995).4 Che and Hausch (1999) concentrate on purely
cooperative and hybrid investments. They show that with purely cooperative in-
vestments contracting has value only if the parties can commit not to renegotiate,
while renegotiable contracts offer no advantage over a simple ex post negotiation.
They also show that renegotiable contracts can be valuable when investments are
hybrid. In all the literature we have referred to investments are autonomous, i.e.,
each party decides independently from the other and one party’s investment has
effect even if the other decides not to invest.
In this paper we study the value of partial commitment to solve the hold-up
problem for joint investments. Joint investments require an explicit cooperation
between the parties: one party investment generates benefits only if the other
party also invests, so that investments are complementary. In that setting, we
show that with joint investments renegotiable contracts are always potentially
4See Schmitz (2001) for an excellent review of the hold-up problem and the incomplete
contract literature.
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valuable, but never able to restore first best incentives for both parties.
This result echoes the hybrid case of Che and Hausch where a simple contract
is also potentially valuable without restoring first best incentives. However, the
setting is different. They coined as purely cooperative or partly cooperative
(i.e., hybrid) investments that are autonomous.5 Thus, a restriction of the Che
and Hausch’s investments lies in their lack of joint work. In our setting, firms
cooperate in the sense that their investments are complementary.
Considering joint investments may help to understand how cooperation emerges
in Japanese procurement practices. Our framework roughly fits some stylized
facts about the Japanese buyer-supplier relationships. First, parties trade in
customized parts, which require autonomous and joint relationship-specific in-
vestments (see among others Asanuma, 1985a,b, 1989; Aoki, 1988, Nishiguchi,
1994, Qiu and Spencer, 2002 and Spencer and Qiu, 2001). As an example of
joint investments, Japanese car manufacturers cooperate with suppliers to design
parts of the final product.6 They coordinate tasks, share information and meet
each other. This cooperation is typically linked to joint investments, which are
the source of productivity improvements over time. Second, Japanese practices
tend to differ from American ones in key areas such as quality control and price
determination. However, characterizing Japanese arrangements as informal and
cooperative and Western arrangements as formal and antagonistic is a coarse
generalization. In fact, the difference is blurred, as Western firms have adopted
many Japanese practices (see e.g Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991), while Japanese
firms contract with their partners (Asanuma, 1985a,b, Nishiguchi, 1989). Based
on a survey of automobile manufacturers, Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) provide
evidence of the contractual nature of the Japanese buyer-supplier relationships.
They find that, for each new model of car, parties sign a new contract. “The most
common contract (62 percent of the sample) is 4 years, corresponding to the av-
erage model life-cycle” (Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991). Given that the average
5The term “cross investments” might be a more suitable name in that case. The term
“cooperative investments” was coined by Che and Hausch (1999), although their main idea
(i.e., that contracts are useless with purely cooperative investments when renegotiation cannot
be rule out) appeared earlier in the literature. It was actually derived first in the 1988 discussion
paper of Maskin and Moore (1999), but these authors did not introduce a specific name for
such investments. MacLeod and Malcomson (1983) also studied such investments but they also
did not come up with a name.
6For instance, with the introduction of the airbag systems car manufacturers initiated coop-
erations with plastic subcontractors to redesign the dashboard and bear the additional weight
of the airbag.
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total duration of a Japanese buyer-supplier relationship is about ten years, this
means that parties sign up to three different contracts by relationship. Third,
these contractual arrangements provide room for renegotiation. Parties write
basic renegotiable contracts establishing basic rules covering a range of items
including price determination, payment, delivery, property rights, the supply of
materials and quality issues (Nishiguchi, 1989). Finally, these contractual ar-
rangements also promote cooperation. The typical contract sets a target price
for each input produced. Buyers then cooperate and help suppliers to reach their
targets (Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991; see also Nishiguchi, 1989). Therefore,
overall Japanese firms seem to rely on partial commitment to their relationships
and ex post bargaining to promote cooperation and joint investments.
Our result also echoes the literature on the value of partial commitment
devices in other strategic and decision-theoretic environments. For instance,
Colombo and Merzoni (2006, 2008) stress the value of partial commitment to
a relationship in terms of the duration of contracts, while Amador et al. (2006)
show the value of commitment devices that partially limit the freedom of choice
with time-inconsistent preferences.
Our contribution is also related to Mclaren (1999), who distinguishes joint
from autonomous investments. However, the latter are assumed to be not re-
lationship specific. This implies parties can pay an additional fee to adapt
the tailor-made input to an alternative buyer. Under this assumption, a non-
renegotiable fixed-price contract gives optimal incentives for autonomous invest-
ments, but not for joint work. Ex post bargaining is thus required to foster
cooperation, as the supplier can always get the buyer to share the costs ex post.
We assume instead that autonomous investments are relationship-specific and
we find that a fixed-price contract is valuable to promote cooperation.7 How-
ever, this result is not necessarily in conflict with McLaren (1999). In fact, in
both settings, the possibility of bargaining ex post fosters cooperation: although
the present setting underlines the value of contracting as partial commitment,
7We demonstrate this result for both a renegotiable and non-renegotiable fixed-price con-
tract. The latter implies that the default point value is zero. Since specific investments are
sunk, the break-up of the contract would generate a loss of value and give optimal incentives
to invest. As a result, it can be demonstrated that if parties credibly commit not to renego-
tiate their initial fixed-price contract, optimal cooperation can be reached, by implementing a
game of messages which discloses the relevant information to a third party. See supplementary
material on http://jose.desousa.univ.free.fr/research/sup.htm.
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contract incompleteness leaves room for renegotiation.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present
the model, a simple two-stage game between a buyer and a supplier. In section
3, we establish two benchmark outcomes to compare our results: the first-best
and the ex post bargaining (without an initial contract). In section 4, we show
how a formal fixed-price contract arrangement may foster cooperation. Finally,
in section 5, we conclude.
2 Model
We consider a basic two-stage procurement model between a buyer (b) and a
supplier (s). The buyer procures an input from the supplier. There are two
simple ways of procuring the input: a formal or an informal arrangement.
In the formal arrangement, parties design a renegotiable fixed-price contract
in the first stage and specify ex ante a fixed monetary transfer (t ∈ ℜ) of the buyer
to the supplier for a fixed quantity of input (q ∈ ℜ+). This initial allocation is
enforceable by the court and ensures for the parties a status quo payoff. Contract
terms are enforced in the second stage, unless they are renegotiated, in which case
parties share ex post the surplus from renegotiation according to their bargaining
strength.
In the informal arrangement, parties agree verbally, in the first stage, on the
quantity of input without signing an initial contract. In the second stage, they
bargain the terms of trade and determine the payment.
Whatever the arrangement, not contractible autonomous and joint invest-
ments are made simultaneously in the first stage. They are relationship-specific,
which rules out outside options and the possibility of adapting the input for an
alternative buyer (see above).
Payoff functions and the nature of investments
Let v(q, jb, js) denote the buyer’s gross value of procuring the good q ∈ ℜ+
and c(q, a, jb, js) the supplier’s gross monetary cost of producing q. Valuations
are determined by relationship-specific investments. Let a ∈ ℜ+ be the level
(and cost) of autonomous investments made by the supplier. We first present the
8We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this interpretation.
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assumptions made throughout this study before commenting in more details on
a, jb and js.
Assumption 1 v and c are continuously differentiable in all arguments.
Assumption 2 v(q, jb, js) ≥ 0 is increasing in all arguments and strictly con-
cave. For all q > 0 and (jb, js) ∈ ℜ
2
+, it satisfies:
lim
q→0
v1(q, jb, js) =∞, lim
jb→0
v2(q, jb, js) =∞, lim
js→0
v3(q, jb, js) =∞;
lim
q→∞
v1(q, jb, js) = 0, lim
jb→∞
v2(q, jb, js) = 0, lim
js→∞
v3(q, jb, js) = 0.
Assumption 3 c(q, a, jb, js) ≥ 0 is increasing in q, decreasing in investments
and strictly convex. For all q > 0 and (a, jb, js) ∈ ℜ
3
+, it satisfies:
limq→0 c1(q, a, jb, js) = 0 lima→0 c2(q, a, jb, js) = −∞,
limjb→0 c3(q, a, jb, js) = −∞ limjs→0 c4(q, a, jb, js) = −∞.
limq→∞ c1(q, a, jb, js) =∞ lima→∞ c2(q, a, jb, js) = 0,
limjb→∞ c3(q, a, jb, js) = 0 limjs→∞ c4(q, a, jb, js) = 0.
Concavity and convexity of assumptions 2 and 3 imply decreasing returns for
both parties.
Assumption 4
∀(jb, js) ∈ ℜ
2
+ v(0, jb, js) = 0, and ∀(a, jb, js) ∈ ℜ
3
+ c(0, a, jb, js) = 0.
Assumption (4) says that when q = 0 both valuations do no depend on the
level of investments. Since there is no outside market for investments, this as-
sumption suggests that investments are relationship-specific (Chung, 1991: 1034).
Assumption 5 The cross derivatives of v(q, jb, js) and c(q, a, jb, js) satisfy
viℓ(q, jb, js) > 0 and ciℓ(q, a, jb, js) < 0 for all i 6= ℓ.
Assumption (5) says that investments are complementary.
Assumption 6
v2(q, jb, 0) = 0, and c3(q, a, 0, js) = 0.
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Assumption (6) stipulates that the marginal return of joint investments is
null when only one party is contributing. This assumption departs from other
related structures of investments in the literature. Thus, our structure would be
equivalent to the Edlin and Reichelstein (1996)’s one-sided investment structure
if we dropped jb and js and only retained the autonomous investment a, which is a
‘selfish’ investment directly benefiting only to the supplier through its valuation c.
Following the terminology coined by Che and Hausch (1999), a can also be purely
cooperative or partly cooperative (i.e., hybrid). Recall that a is partly cooperative
when it affects both valuations c and v and purely cooperative when it affects
only the buyer’s valuation v. However, Che and Hausch (1999)’s terminology may
be somewhat misleading since “cooperative” has nothing to do with cooperative
behavior. There is no joint work. Cooperation is achieved independently from
the other party and a has an effect even if the other decides not to invest. In our
setting, a is a selfish investment and cooperation is achieved through additional
joint investments jb and js affecting both valuations. Following assumptions (5)
and (6), joint investments are complementary and require an explicit cooperation
between the parties: one party investment generates benefits only if the other
party also invests. Using this structure of investments, we study the value of
partial commitment to solve the hold-up problem for joint investments.
3 Benchmark outcomes
We establish two useful benchmarks, the first-best and the no-contracting out-
come, with which later results about contracting may be compared.
3.1 The first-best outcome
The first-best corresponds to the solution of the integrated firm program, which
internalizes the effects of investment. The maximization program of the inte-
grated firm is separable. In a first step, we determine the optimal quantity (q∗)
given the investment levels. Then, we determine the investment levels given the
optimal quantity.
Let Π denote the maximum gross joint surplus, such that:
Π(a, jb, js) = max
q≥0
[v(q, jb, js)− c(q, a, jb, js)] .
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According to the optimality condition v1 = c1, we obtain
q∗ = q∗(a, jb, js) (1)
the quantity equalizing the marginal benefit to the marginal cost, therefore
Π(a, jb, js) = v(q
∗, jb, js)− c(q
∗, a, jb, js).
The net joint surplus of investments S(a, jb, js) is given by:
S(a, jb, js) = Π(a, jb, js)− a− jb − js,
with Π(a, jb, js) strictly concave since v(.) is concave and c(.) convex. The efficient
investments are such that (a∗, j∗b , j
∗
s ) ∈ argmaxa,jb,js Π(a, jb, js)− a− jb − js.
Given the assumptions on v and c, (a∗, j∗b , j
∗
s ) are unique and satisfy a system
of first-order conditions (FOCs):
Π1(a
∗, j∗b , j
∗
s )− 1 = 0, (2)
Π2(a
∗, j∗b , j
∗
s )− 1 = 0, (3)
Π3(a
∗, j∗b , j
∗
s )− 1 = 0, (4)
3.2 The (informal) no-contracting outcome
We now consider the no-contracting game. Let us recall the sequence of events.
Ex ante, parties agree verbally, without a prior contract, that the supplier will
produce the input. Ex post, parties share the surplus according to their exogenous
bargaining positions.9 The optimal quantity q∗ ∈ ℜ+ and the monetary transfer
t ∈ ℜ are determined in the second stage, while investments are realized in the
first stage.
At the second stage, the negotiation outcome on q and t is solution of a Nash
bargaining process, with µ ∈ [0, 1] the supplier’s bargaining strength:
max
t,q
[v(q, jb, js)− t]
1−µ[t− c(q, a, jb, js)]
µ.
Therefore q∗ = q∗(a, jb, js), is implicitly determined by
v1(q
∗, jb, js) = c1(q
∗, a, jb, js),
and
t(a, jb, js) = (1− µ)c(q
∗, a, jb, js) + µv(q
∗, jb, js).
At the first stage, the buyer and the supplier maximize their surplus:
9In an incomplete contract framework, it does not seem reasonable to assume that bargaining
positions may be endogenously determined ex ante and enforced.
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• for the buyer:
Ub = v(q
∗, jb, js)− (1− µ)c(q
∗, a, jb, js)− µv(q
∗, jb, js)− jb;
• for the supplier:
Us = (1− µ)c(q
∗, a, jb, js) + µv(q
∗, jb, js)− c(q
∗, a, jb, js)− a− js.
Given the optimal produced quantity q∗, determined by equation (1) in both
the first-best and the no-contracting outcome, we rewrite the above surplus us-
ing Π(a, jb, js). It follows that parties choose the investment levels of the no-
contracting outcome (â, ̂b, ̂s) satisfying
(̂b) ∈ argmaxjb(1− µ)Π(a, jb, js)− jb,
(â, ̂s) ∈ argmaxa,js µΠ(a, jb, js)− a− js,
and the following system of FOCs:
∂Ub
∂jb
= (1− µ)Π2(â, ̂b, ĵs)− 1 = 0, (5)
∂Us
∂a
= µΠ1(â, ̂b, ̂s)− 1 = 0, (6)
∂Us
∂js
= µΠ3(â, ̂b, ̂s)− 1 = 0. (7)
Since µ ∈ [0, 1], efficiency cannot be achieved. This may be explained as fol-
lows. Investments are made ex ante, while the surplus is shared ex post according
to the bargaining positions. The payment t is determined independently of the
investments made; therefore, externalities cannot be internalized.
What are the consequences of such an inefficiency? Given the concavity of
Π(a, jb, js), the parties will invest less than the socially optimal level.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions (1) to (6), the absence of contracting prior
investing in specific assets induces under-investments, such that: â < a∗, ̂b < j
∗
b
and ̂s < j
∗
s .
Proof See appendix (A).
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4 Contracting and cooperation
We have seen that parties do not reach efficiency by simply bargaining ex post
the terms of trade without a prior contract. Now suppose that parties sign a
simple renegotiable fixed-price contract that specifies a fixed monetary transfer
(t ∈ ℜ) of the buyer to the supplier for a fixed quantity of goods (q ∈ ℜ+). Two
questions arise. First, does the signing of this simple renegotiable contract make
it possible to achieve efficiency? Second, failing that, does contracting offer a
better outcome than the no-contracting game? If not, the contract has no value,
and the optimal contract is the ‘no contract.’
4.1 The contracting outcome
With regard to the first question, we find in a simple way that contracting does
not make it possible to reach the first-best. This is not very surprising and can
be shown formally.
Let first define the (gross) renegotiation surplus (RS), available ex post as:
RS = Π(a, jb, js)− [v(q, jb, js)− c(q, a, jb, js)].
At the second stage, we assume a Nash bargaining process on q and t, solu-
tion of
max
t,q
[
v(q, jb, js)− t− v(q, jb, js) + t
]1−µ
×
[
t− c(q, a, jb, js)− t+ c(q, a, jb, js)
]µ
.
We obtain q∗ = q∗(a, jb, js) implicitly determined by
v1(q
∗, jb, js) = c1(q
∗, a, jb, js),
and
t(a, jb, js) = (1−µ) [c(q
∗, a, jb, js)− c(q, a, jb, js)]+µ [v(q
∗, jb, js)− v(q, jb, js)]+ t.
The first stage objectives to be maximized are:
• for the buyer:
Ub = v(q, jb, js)− t︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+(1− µ)RS︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
−jb.
(A) is the buyer’s payoff given by the initial contract. It represents the
buyer’s status quo position. (B) is the payoff from the renegotiation process,
depending on the buyer’s bargaining strength (1− µ).
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• for the supplier:
Us = t− c(q, a, jb, js)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
+µRS︸︷︷︸
D
−a− js.
(C) is the supplier’s cost given by the initial contract. It represents the
supplier’s status quo position. (D) is the payoff from the renegotiation
process, depending on the supplier’s bargaining strength µ.
Parties make the investment levels of the contracting outcome (a˜, ˜b, ˜s), sat-
isfying
(˜b) ∈ argmaxjb v(q, jb, js)− t+ (1− µ)RS − jb,
(a˜, ˜s) ∈ argmaxa,js t− c(q, a, jb, js) + µRS − a− js.
and the following system of first-order conditions:
∂Ub
∂jb
= µv2(q, ˜b, ˜s) + (1− µ)c3(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s) + (1− µ)Π2(a˜, ˜b, ˜s)− 1 = 0, (8)
∂Us
∂a
= −(1− µ)c2(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s) + µΠ1(a˜, ˜b, ˜s)− 1 = 0, (9)
∂Us
∂js
= −µv3(q, ˜b, ˜s)− (1− µ)c4(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s) + µΠ3(a˜, ˜b, ˜s)− 1 = 0. (10)
Since µ ∈ [0, 1], it is not possible to implement the first-best outcome. This
implies that contracting with renegotiation does not make it possible to achieve
efficiency.
4.2 Contracting or no-contracting?
We fail to achieve efficiency with contracting. However, we wonder whether
writing a contract is valuable, that is, if contracting offers a better outcome than
no-contracting. A simple comparison of the no-contracting FOCs (5 - 7) with
the contracting FOCs (8 - 10) shows that there is no obvious result regarding the
improving effect of contracting.
The bargaining position (µ) plays an important role in deriving more precise
results about the comparison between contracting and no-contracting outcomes.
Before proceeding to the formal comparison, we consider some critical values of
the parameter µ and two useful lemmas. Then we work out the comparison.
Let first define the set A:
A = {k ∈ [0, 1]/kv3(q, jb, js) + (1− k)c4(q, a, jb, js) ≤ 0, ∀q, a, jb, js} .
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Let µ = supA. This number exists; if k = 0, the above inequality, used to
define supA, reduces to c4(q, a, jb, js) ≤ 0, which is satisfied ∀q, a, jb, js. The
following useful lemma can now be stated.
Lemma 1 If µ < µ, then: µv3(q, jb, js) + (1− µ)c4(q, a, jb, js) ≤ 0, ∀q, a, jb, js.
Proof See appendix (B).
We now define one other critical value of µ. Consider the set C:
C = {k ∈ [0, 1]/kv2(q, jb, js) + (1− k)c3(q, a, jb, js) ≥ 0, ∀q, a, jb, js} .
Let define µ = inf C. This number again exists; if k = 1, the inequality, used
to define C, becomes v3(q, jb, js) ≥ 0, which is satisfied ∀q, jb, js. A second useful
lemma can now be stated.
Lemma 2 If µ > µ, then: µv2(q, jb, js) + (1− µ)c3(q, a, jb, js) ≥ 0, ∀q, a, jb, js.
Proof The proof is the same as the one of Lemma 1. ‖
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we now determine the value of the simple fixed-price
contract in comparison with the no-contracting outcome:
Proposition 2 Suppose that assumptions (1) to (6) hold. If µ < µ < µ, then
the no-contracting outcome generates a general under-investment in comparison
with the contracting outcome. It follows that â < a˜, ̂b < ˜b and ̂s < ˜s.
Proof See appendix (C).
The results of propositions (1) and (2) state that no-contracting leads to
under-investments compared to both the first-best and the contracting solutions.
However, these propositions do not discriminate between contracting and no-
contracting outcomes in terms of welfare. Contracting would be welfare improv-
ing, if we could prove that (suboptimal) contracting investments are lower than
the first-best ones, given that over-investment is also a suboptimal solution. The
comparison of the first-best and the contracting outcomes depends on the value
of q fixed in the contract. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that assumptions (1) to (6) hold. If q is such that q <
q∗(a˜, ˜b, ˜s), then the contracting outcome generates a general under-investment
in comparison with the first-best. It follows that a˜ < a∗, ˜b < 
∗
b and ˜s < 
∗
s.
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Proof See appendix (D).
The contracting investment levels (a˜, ˜b, ˜s) depend on the value of q (see
equations 8-10). It turns out that if q is such that q < q∗(a˜, ˜b, ˜s), then investment
levels in the contracting case are lower than in the first-best outcome.
The above proposition can be usefully supplemented by a corollary stating
the existence of a critical value for q.
Corollary 1 For a given µ, suppose there exists a value q such that the resulting
contracting investment levels satisfy : q = q∗(a˜, j˜s, j˜b). The contracting invest-
ment levels are then independent of µ.
Proof See appendix (E).
The contracting investment levels are function of µ and q. Thus, for each
value of µ, it should exist a value of q compatible with q = q∗(a˜, j˜s, j˜b). The
above corollary states that the value of q ensuring that q = q∗(a˜, j˜s, j˜b) is in fact
independent of µ.
4.3 Numerical investigations
The two preceding propositions suggest that parameters µ and q play a cru-
cial role in the comparison of the different outcomes (in terms of investments,
produced quantities and total surplus). Unfortunately, it is not possible first to
provide precise analytical results enabling the discrimination between contracting
and no-contracting outcomes, and second, to perform surplus comparisons. We
conduct instead numerical investigations to provide insight into the influence of
parameters µ and q on the model outcomes.
The buyer’s value and the supplier’s cost functions are defined as follows:
v(q, b, s) = B0q
b0
[
(β2b 
β2
s )
θ
]b1
,
c(q, a, b, s) = = A0q
a0
[(
α0a
−
1−σ
σ + α1
−
1−σ
σ
b + α2
−
1−σ
σ
s
)−ν σ
1−σ
]−a1
,
with B0 > 0, b0, b1 > 0, b0 + b1 < 1, β1, β2 > 0, β1 + β2 = 1, 0 < θ < 1, A0 > 0,
a0 > 1,a1 > 0, a0−a1 > 1, σ > 0, 0 < ν < 1, α0, α1, α2 > 0 and α0+α1+α2 = 1.
Numerical investigations are made using the following benchmark calibration:
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Table 1: Benchmark calibrations
Buyer’s value
B0 b0 b1 β1 β2 θ
10 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.8
Supplier’s cost
A0 a0 a1 α0 α1 α2 σ ν
10 2 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Under this parametrization, assumptions (1-6) are satisfied.10 First best re-
sults reported in Table (2) are graphically represented in Figures (1) and (2).
Table 2: First best results
q∗ a∗ ∗b 
∗
s S
∗
0.3252 0.4530 1.2317 0.6391 2.0334
Let’s first study the impact of a variation of the supplier’s bargaining strength
µ on the investment levels, the produced quantities and the total surplus, under
three cases: first-best, no-contracting and contracting. Several values of the fixed
quantity q are considered for the contracting case.11
Figure (1) provides a representation in terms of produced quantities and total
surplus. Regarding produced quantities (q), the numerical investigations suggest
that q is sensitive in the contracting case to the value of the fixed quantity q.
More precisely, q increases as q grows. Results also show that the contracting
produced quantities are always above the no-contracting ones and may be above
the first best ones for high values of q.12 We identify a critical value of q, sat-
isfying q = q∗(a˜, j˜b, j˜s), which is roughly 0.24. If q is less than this value, the
contracting produced quantity is increasing in µ. The converse applies if q is
greater than the critical value. Finally, if q is equal to the critical value, the
contacting produced quantities (and investment levels) are higher than the no-
contracting values, lower than the first-best, and independent of the supplier’s
bargaining strength (consistently with corollary 1).
Concerning total surplus, our simulations in Figure (1) show that the no-
contracting case surplus is significantly smaller than the first-best. However,
10Assumptions (5) and (6) about the supplier’s cost function are satisfied if νa1 −
1−σ
σ
< 0.
11The contracting case with q = 0 is similar to the no-contracting case.
12This is the case when q is about 1.5 times the value of the quantity produced in the fist-best
case (see table 2).
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contracting allows significant improvement. The total surplus increases as q
grows. Moreover, our numerical investigations suggest there exists values of µ
and q that maximize the contracting surplus. Solving a second-best problem,13
we determine the values of µ∗ and q∗ maximizing the contracting total surplus.
Results reported in Table 3 suggest that contracting may significantly improve
the allocation. If µ and q are appropriately set, the contracting surplus is very
close to the first-best (it is less by 1.44%).
Table 3: Contracting results (q∗ = 0.4571 and µ∗ = 0.6144)
q˜ a˜ ˜b ˜s S˜
0.3206 0.5436 1.1694 0.5259 2.0042
A principal function of the fixed-price contract is to fix an initial quantity
of input (q ∈ ℜ+). Then, for a given µ, how can we determine the value of q
maximizing the contracting total surplus? To begin with, suppose that invest-
ments are such that v3(q, jb, js) = c3(q, a, jb, js) = 0. In that case, it can easily be
checked that a contract setting q = q(a∗, j∗b , j
∗
s ) implements the first-best, which
is consistent with Edlin and Reichelstein (1995). However, this is no longer true
with joint investments and only a second-best can be achieved. Figure (2) depicts
the second-best quantities and surplus.14 If the second best value of q is chosen,
the surplus loss with respect to the first best values roughly varies from 1.4% to
4.2%. In contrast, in the no-contracting case, the minimum loss surplus is about
30%. Thus, implementing the second-best significantly improves efficiency.
We also provide results when q is set at specific values of interest: the first-
best (q∗ = 0.325) and the critical value (q = 0.24). The total surplus of the
contracting outcome is again significantly higher than in the no-contracting case.
In particular, choosing q = q∗ induces a surplus loss varying from 2.3% to 4.3%.
In other words, choosing the first best value q = q∗, in a setting with joint
investments, significantly improves efficiency (compared to no-contracting).15
In our framework, optimality is not attainable for two reasons. First, parties
are linked by a relationship specific-investment. The good is not traded on a com-
petitive market and partners have no outside options. So, inefficient investment
13We determine the values of µ and q maximizing the total surplus subject to the set of
constraints constituted by equations (8)-(10).
14For a given value of µ, we determine the values of q maximizing the total surplus subject
to the set of constraints (8)-(10).
15Note that without joint investment optimality is restored when q = q∗.
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occurs due to a traditional hold-up problem. Each party under-invests because
it receives only a fraction of the marginal return of its investment. The private
marginal return of investment is thus lower than the social marginal return.
Second, there are joint investments (and thus investment externalities). The
buyer’s value v and the seller’s cost c are both influenced by jb and js. Thus, the
investment of one party has a positive effect on the marginal value of the other
party (supermodularity assumption). In the no-contracting case, supermodular-
ity leads parties to under-invest and optimality can not be achieved. Are parties
made better off by contracting and renegotiating? The contracting game is also
altered due to joint investments. However, our numerical investigations suggest
that renegotiation may improve the total surplus. Contracting (equations (8) —
(10) ) induces a modification of the marginal return of investment that comprises
two terms. First, under contracting, an investment increases the status quo po-
sition of the investor. But, second, if this investment is joint, this also increases
the status quo payoff of the trading partner, which weakens the investor’s posi-
tion. The net gain obtained by the investor is a weighted mean (depending of the
bargaining power) of these two effects. An increase in the investor’s bargaining
power tends to reduce its net gain through a reduction of its status quo position
and an increase in the trading partner’s payoff. So, a higher bargaining power
leads to a smaller gain from renegotiation. In other words, a party has little
interest in renegotiating if it has a strong bargaining power.
What are the effects of the fixed quantity q on the renegotiation stage? We
discuss now how changes in q provide incentives to improve the total surplus.
Recall that if q = 0, the no-contacting solution is attained, while increasing q
improves the status quo position of the investors.16 However, in case of joint
investments, the trading partner payoff is also improved, which leads to a reduc-
tion of the bargaining position of the investor. It follows that increasing q has
an ambiguous effect on the bargaining position of the investor (which is not the
case with an autonomous investment).
To sum up, q and µ may have ambiguous effects that can not be evaluated
analytically. Our numerical investigations however show that writing a contract
may be valuable and that the values of q and µ matter. As a whole, starting from
an under-investment situation (no-contracting or q = 0), increasing q allows to
improve the total surplus because it increases the investors’ bargaining position.
16Recall that v1i > 0 and c1i < 0 for all i > 1.
17
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze two simple ways in which the input could be procured:
(1) a renegotiable fixed-price contract and (2) an ex post bargaining of the terms
of trade without a prior contract. We found that arrangements fail both to
achieve efficiency and to provide an incentive for optimal joint investments. A
direct implication of this result is that a process of vertical integration, with a
unified direction, provides optimal incentives to cooperate.
We also aimed to compare the contracting and the no-contracting solutions.
We found that contracting induces larger autonomous and joint investments com-
pared to not contracting. Moreover, our formal analysis suggests that the sup-
plier’s bargaining strength and the fixed quantity of input play a crucial role in the
comparison of the different outcomes (in terms of investments, produced quanti-
ties and total surplus). Formally, contracting is welfare-improving for values of
the fixed quantity lower than a given threshold. Numerically, we have shown that
the contracting surplus is very close to the first-best one for appropriate values of
the supplier’s bargaining strength and the fixed quantity of input. Therefore, ex
post bargaining is not always needed to promote cooperation. This is in line with
Japanese procurement practices, where firms rely both on partial commitment to
their relationships and ex post bargaining to promote cooperation
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A Proof of proposition 1
It is worth noting that assumption (5) implies that Πil > 0 for all i 6= l.
Consider now the following problem:
max
a,jb,js
Π(a, jb, js)−
(
λ+
1− λ
µ
)
a−
(
λ+
1− λ
1− µ
)
jb −
(
λ+
1− λ
µ
)
js. (11)
with λ ∈ [0, 1].
The first-order conditions are:
Π1(a, jb, js) = λ+
1− λ
µ
,
Π2(a, jb, js) = λ+
1− λ
1− µ
,
Π3(a, jb, js) = λ+
1− λ
µ
.
The maximization problem (11) has a unique solution, that is, a(λ), jb(λ) and js(λ).
Note that a(1) = a∗, jb(1) = j
∗
b , js(1) = j
∗
s and a(0) = â, jb(0) = ̂b, js(0) = ̂s.
Define
V (λ) = Π(a(λ), jb(λ), js(λ))−
(
λ+
1− λ
µ
)
a(λ)
−
(
λ+
1− λ
1− µ
)
jb(λ)−
(
λ+
1− λ
µ
)
js(λ),
and
W (λ) = Π(a(λ0), jb(λ0), js(λ0))−
(
λ+
1− λ
µ
)
a(λ0)
−
(
λ+
1− λ
1− µ
)
jb(λ0)−
(
λ+
1− λ
µ
)
js(λ0)− V (λ).
We necessarily have W (λ) ≤ 0 and W (λ0) = 0. Thus, the function W (λ) attains a maxi-
mum at λ = λ0. At this point, the first and second order optimality conditions are necessarily
satisfied, we thus have W ′(λ0) = 0 and W
′′(λ0) < 0.
The first and second derivatives of W (λ) are:
W ′(λ) = −
(
1−
1
µ
)
a(λ0)−
(
1−
1
1− µ
)
jb(λ0)
−
(
1−
1
µ
)
js(λ0)− V
′(λ),
W ′′(λ) = −V ′′(λ).
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The first-order condition gives:
W ′(λ0) = −
(
1−
1
µ
)
a(λ0)−
(
1−
1
1− µ
)
jb(λ0)
−
(
1−
1
µ
)
js(λ0)− V
′(λ0) = 0.
The above expression holds for any λ0. The first derivative of V (λ) is then:
V ′(λ) = −
(
1−
1
µ
)
a(λ)−
(
1−
1
1− µ
)
jb(λ)−
(
1−
1
µ
)
js(λ).
We deduce the expression of the second derivative of V (λ):
V ′′(λ) = −
(
1−
1
µ
)
a′(λ) −
(
1−
1
1− µ
)
j′b(λ) −
(
1−
1
µ
)
j′s(λ).
The second order condition W ′′(λ0) < 0 also holds for any λ0. We thus have W
′′(λ) < 0 for all
λ. Consequently:
W ′′(λ) = −
(
1−
1
µ
)
a′(λ)−
(
1−
1
1− µ
)
j′b(λ)−
(
1−
1
µ
)
j′s(λ) < 0.
Given that µ ∈]0, 1[, we necessarily have a′(λ) > 0 or j′b(λ) > 0 or j
′
s(λ) > 0. Suppose for
example that a′(λ) > 0 and differentiate the FOCs with respect to λ to obtain:
a′(λ)Π11 + j
′
b(λ)Π12 + j
′
s(λ)Π13 = 1−
1
µ
< 0,
a′(λ)Π21 + j
′
b(λ)Π22 + j
′
s(λ)Π23 = 1−
1
1− µ
< 0,
a′(λ)Π31 + j
′
b(λ)Π32 + j
′
s(λ)Π33 = 1−
1
µ
< 0.
The cross derivatives Πij being negative, we get:
j′b(λ)Π22 + j
′
s(λ)Π23 = 1−
1
1− µ
− a′(λ)Π21 < 0,
j′b(λ)Π32 + j
′
s(λ)Π33 = 1−
1
µ
− a′(λ)Π31 < 0.
It immediately follows that:
(
j′b(λ) j
′
s(λ)
)( Π22 Π23
Π32 Π33
)(
j′b(λ)
j′s(λ)
)
= j′b(λ)
(
1−
1
1− µ
− a′b(λ)Π31
)
+ j′s(λ)
(
1−
1
µ
− a′b(λ)Π41
)
< 0.
We necessarily have j′b(λ) > 0 or j
′
s(λ) > 0. Suppose for example that j
′
b(λ) > 0. The same
argument shows that j′s(λ) > 0. ‖
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B Proof of lemma 1
Consider any values of q, a, jb, js. Define g(µ) = µv3(q, jb, js) + (1 − µ)c4(q, a, jb, js).
We get g′(µ) = v3(q, jb, js)− c4(q, a, jb, js) > 0.
It follows that g(µ) < g(µ¯) ≤ 0, ∀µ ∈ [0, µ¯[.
C Proof of proposition 2
Let (a˜, ˜b, ˜s) ∈ ℜ
3
+ be the investment levels of the contracting outcome, solutions of the follow-
ing first-order conditions:
(1 − µ)Π2(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) = 1− µv2(q, ˜b, ˜s)− (1− µ)c3(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s),
µΠ1(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) = 1 + (1− µ)c2(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s),
µΠ3(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) = 1 + µv3(q, ˜b, ˜s) + (1− µ)c4(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s).
(â, ̂b, ̂s) ∈ ℜ
3
+ are the investment levels of the no-contacting solution:
(1− µ)Π2(â, ̂b, ̂s) = 1; µΠ1(â, ̂b, ̂s) = 1; µΠ3(â, ̂b, ̂s) = 1.
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, it can be easily shown that for all µ ∈ [µ, µ]
Π1(a˜, ˜b, ˜s)−Π1(â, ̂b, ̂s) =
1− µ
µ
c2(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s) < 0,
Π2(a˜, ˜b, ˜s)−Π2(â, ̂b, ̂s) = −
1
1− µ
[µv2(q, ˜b, ˜s) + (1− µ)c3(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s)] < 0,
Π3(a˜, ˜b, ˜s)−Π3(â, ̂b, ̂s) =
1
µ
[µv3(q, ˜b, ˜s) + (1− µ)c4(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s)] < 0,
The rest of the proof is similar to the one of the under-investment result in the no-contracting
outcome (see proposition 1). ‖
D Proof of proposition 3
Let (a˜, ˜b, ˜s) ∈ ℜ
3
+ be the investment levels of the contracting outcome, solutions of the follow-
ing first-order conditions:
(1 − µ)Π2(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) = 1− µv2(q, ˜b, ˜s)− (1− µ)c3(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s),
µΠ1(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) = 1 + (1− µ)c2(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s),
µΠ3(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) = 1 + µv3(q, ˜b, ˜s) + (1− µ)c4(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s).
The above conditions can be rewritten as follows:
1−Π2(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) = −µΠ2(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) + µv2(q, ˜b, ˜s) + (1 − µ)c3(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s),
1−Π1(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) = −(1− µ)Π1(a˜, ˜b, ˜s)− (1 − µ)c2(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s),
1−Π3(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) = −(1− µ)Π3(a˜, ˜b, ˜s)− µv3(q, ˜b, ˜s)− (1− µ)c4(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s).
(a∗, ∗b , 
∗
s) ∈ ℜ
3
+ are the investment levels of the first-best solution:
Π2(a
∗, ∗b , 
∗
s) = 1; Π1(a
∗, ∗b , 
∗
s) = 1; Π3(a
∗, ∗b , 
∗
s) = 1.
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Assumption 5 implies c2 and c4 are decreasing in q and v2 is increasing in q. It is easily
deduced that if q satisfies q < q∗(a˜, ˜b, ˜s), one has:
Π1(a
∗, ∗b , 
∗
s)−Π1(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) = (1− µ) [c2(q
∗(a˜, ˜b, ˜s), a˜, ˜b, ˜s)− c2(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s)] < 0,
Π2(a
∗, ∗b , 
∗
s)−Π2(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) = µ [v2(q, ˜b, ˜s)− v2(q
∗(a˜, ˜b, ˜s), ˜b, ˜s)]
+ µc3(q
∗(a˜, ˜b, ˜s), ˜b, ˜s) + (1 − µ)c3(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s) < 0,
Π3(a
∗, ∗b , 
∗
s)−Π3(a˜, ˜b, ˜s) = (1− µ) [c4(q
∗(a˜, ˜b, ˜s), a˜, ˜b, ˜s)− c4(q, a˜, ˜b, ˜s)]
− (1− µ)v3(q
∗(a˜, ˜b, ˜s), ˜b, ˜s)− µv3(q, ˜b, ˜s) < 0,
The rest of the proof is similar to the one of the under-investment result in the no-contracting
outcome (see proposition 1). ‖
E Proof of corollary 1
Consider a given value of µ and suppose there exists q such that q = q∗(a˜, j˜b, j˜s). The con-
tracting investment levels depend on µ and q. Any change in µ may change the value of q
compatible with the previous equality.
It is easy to show that the optimality conditions providing the contracting investment level
take the following form :
µv2(q, j˜b, j˜s) + (1− µ)c3(q, a˜, j˜b, j˜s)
+(1− µ)v2(q
∗(a˜, j˜b, j˜s), j˜b, j˜s)− (1− µ)c3(q
∗(a˜, j˜b, j˜s), j˜b, j˜s)− 1 = 0
−(1− µ)c2(q, a˜, j˜b, j˜s)− µc2(q
∗(a˜, j˜b, j˜s), a˜, j˜b, j˜s)− 1 = 0
−µv3(q, j˜b, j˜s)− (1 − µ)c4(q, a˜, j˜b, j˜s)
+µv3(q
∗(a˜, j˜b, j˜s), j˜b, j˜s)− µc4(q
∗(a˜, j˜b, j˜s), j˜b, j˜s)− 1 = 0
Knowing that q = q∗(a˜, j˜b, j˜s), the above system can be rewritten as follows :
v2(q
∗(a˜, j˜b, j˜s), j˜b, j˜s)− 1 = 0
−c2(q
∗(a˜, j˜b, j˜s), a˜, j˜b, j˜s)− 1 = 0
−c4(q
∗(a˜, j˜b, j˜s), a˜, j˜b, j˜s)− 1 = 0
The solution of the above system, if it exists, is independent of µ. We conclude that if a is
chosen so that q = q∗(a˜, j˜b, j˜s), the contracting investment level is independent of µ.
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